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This paper employs a novel data set on lobbying expenditures to measure the degree of within-sector
political organization and to explore the determinants of the mode of lobbying and political organization
across U.S. industries. The data show that sectors characterized by a higher degree of competition
(more substitutable products and a lower concentration of production) tend to lobby more together
(through a sector-wide trade association), while sectors with higher concentration and more differentiated
products lobby more individually. The paper proposes a theoretical model to interpret the empirical
evidence. In an oligopolistic market, firms can benefit from an increase in their product-specific protection
measure, if they can raise prices and profits. They find it less profitable to do so in a competitive market
where attempts to raise prices are more likely to reduce profits. In competitive markets firms are therefore
more likely to lobby together thereby simultaneously raising tariffs on all products in the sector.
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The in￿ uence of interest groups on policy making is under constant scrutiny. Recent legislative
reforms like the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007 in the United States are
partially a response to the perceived need for transparency and understanding of the activity of
special interest groups (SIG￿ s) and their lobbyists. Much public discussion and academic research
alike revolve around the questions of whether lobbies a⁄ect legislation and how they accomplish
such goal. A fundamental aspect of this process is to understand how special interest groups
organize for the purpose of in￿ uencing the government and what characteristics facilitate the path
to political organization and lobbying. However, even basic stylized facts or systematic empirical
analysis on the choice of political organization are not available for the universe of U.S. industries.
This paper reports a set of novel empirical regularities that counter standard theoretical intuition
in the analysis of lobbying organization and contributes to its understanding by focusing on the
role of market structure primitives in shaping incentives for collective action.
This paper has four goals. The ￿rst is to employ a practically untapped data source on federal
lobbying expenditures to document the degree to which U.S. industrial sectors are politically or-
ganized for the purpose of lobbying (in particular for trade policy). To the best of our knowledge
this is one of the very ￿rst e⁄orts in directly documenting stylized facts of lobbying formation
across a wide spectrum of U.S. industries. The data show that basically every U.S. industry en-
gages in some form of lobbying and that sectors vary widely in the extent to which ￿rms lobby
jointly or individually. The second goal of this work is to show empirically what characteristics
of sectors seem to favor political organization. We ￿nd that sectors that exhibit higher levels of
product market competition and low levels of concentration tend to lobby jointly, that is, through
sector-wide trade associations. This is surprisingly stark evidence against the view that in more
competitive environments free-riding pressures should dominate, inducing political disintegration.
The third goal of the paper is to propose a theoretical model that rationalizes why product market
competition may actually lead to political organization. Although the model is developed for the
case of trade policy, we believe its insight can be applied more broadly to understand the determi-
nants of collective versus individual lobbying. Our fourth goal is to explore if there is a systematic
correlation between mode of lobbying for trade policy and the level of protection in a sector.
Our point of departure is the literature on special interest politics which, in particular with
regard to trade policy, focuses largely on the interaction between a set of interest groups repre-
2senting sectors and the government. Interest groups are treated as unitary actors in many of the
fundamental contributions in this literature, from the political support function approach in Hill-
man (1982), Hillman (1989) and the political competition approach as in Magee et al. (1989) to the
common agency approach proposed by Grossman and Helpman (1994). The focus of these papers
is to understand how the equilibrium trade policy is shaped, starting from the premise that ￿rms
in a sector or agents with interests in a given industry are or not politically organized. This aspect
has been addressed in a number of papers, among which Mitra (1999), Hillman et al. (2001), Felli
and Merlo (2006), and Pecorino (2001) that aim at endogenizing political organization. In the
same spirit, Bombardini (2008) proposes a microfoundation of the decision of ￿rms to participate
in political activity.1
Almost any attempt to analyze the interaction among ￿rms within a sector has to deal with the
collective action problem (￿rst described by Olson (1965)) of lobbying for an object, trade policy,
that bene￿ts all ￿rms in the sector. This is a classic problem of private provision of a public good
(Bergstrom et al. (1986))2.
This paper aims at expanding our understanding of the organization of interest groups by ￿rst
providing an empirical measure of political organization for the purpose of lobbying for trade policy.
We exploit a database of federal lobbying expenditures in the U.S. made available by the Lobby
Disclosure Act of 1995. This data set presents several advantages relative to the information em-
ployed by a large number of papers like Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) and Goldberg and
Maggi (1999), that test the predictions of the protection for sale model. Those papers make use of
campaign contributions data to classify sectors into politically organized or not. The advantage of
employing lobbying expenditures is that we know the issues targeted by lobbyists, while we do not
know why Political Action Committees (PAC￿ s) monetary contributions are given to politicians.
Therefore, we can directly isolate the amount of lobbying expenditures by each sector with the ob-
jective of lobbying for trade policy. The second advantage is that lobbying expenditures represent
quantitatively the most important channel of political in￿ uence. Annual lobbying reports display
amounts at least ten times larger than campaign contributions totals in dollar terms. With few
exceptions, such as Ansolabehere et al. (2002), Hansen et al. (2005), and de Figueiredo and Silver-
1The paper shows that the distribution of ￿rms in the sector a⁄ects the equilibrium share of participation in
political activity and an empirical speci￿cation based on this theory adds explanatory power to the Grossman and
Helpman (1994) model, where sectors are either organized or not in a dichotomous way.
2Also analyzed by Gawande (1997) in the speci￿c case of tari⁄ protection.
3man (2006), lobbying disclosure data have not been frequently employed in the literature and, to
the best of our knowledge, the one we propose is a novel method to measure the degree of political
organization. We show that sectors vary widely in the amount of lobbying expenditures made by
trade associations as opposed to individual ￿rms. In some sectors ￿rms tend to lobby individually,
while in other sectors ￿rms tend to lobby jointly through a trade association.
The second contribution of the paper is to explore sector characteristics that are related to the
mode of lobbying. The empirical analysis shows that more competitive sectors lobby to a greater
degree through a trade association. In particular, we ￿nd that a higher elasticity of substitution
among goods, a lower concentration and a larger capital to labor ratio are associated with a larger
percentage of total lobbying expenditures made through trade associations.
The third contribution of the paper is to propose a theoretical framework that incorporates the
basic features of the data and rationalizes the results found. We model a game among oligopolists
where the goods produced are imperfect substitutes. We hypothesize that there is a domestic and a
foreign producer for each good. Domestic producers have the option of lobbying for a tari⁄ on the
entire sector or for a tari⁄on the speci￿c good that they produce3. When they lobby jointly through
a trade association, they perceive their lobbying e⁄orts to be bene￿tting other ￿rms. Hence, one
of the features of the model is sub-optimal lobbying in the trade association (Olson (1965)). This
mechanism alone would induce ￿rms to lobby for their product-speci￿c tari⁄. Nevertheless, the
imperfectly competitive nature of the sector creates a motive for ￿rms to lobby together. Consider
an attempt of one ￿rm to lobby for an increase in its individual tari⁄. This increase in tari⁄
translates into an increase in price and in pro￿ts only if consumers cannot substitute away from
the good. If the product is very substitutable with other domestic varieties, if there are many
other varieties available (a large number of ￿rms and therefore a low concentration), or if domestic
competitors have similar size, then the ￿rm prefers all tari⁄s to be raised at the same time, which is
accomplished with lobbying by the trade association. The model explains why high substitutability
delivers a higher share of joint lobbying in an unambiguous way. The e⁄ect of heterogeneity and
concentration are less straightforward because there is another e⁄ect going in the opposite direction,
caused by the standard free-rider problem emphasized by Olson (1965), Bergstrom et al. (1986)
and Gawande (1997). The free-rider problem is generally thought to worsen as the industry gets
less concentrated. This e⁄ect is present in this model and tends to make an industry that is more
3See Hula (1999) for survey evidence that ￿rms jointly lobby mostly for general laws.
4concentrated more likely to lobby through a trade association. Whether the free-rider e⁄ect prevails
or not depends on the parameters of the problem, as we discuss in the theoretical section of the
paper.
This paper connects various strands of political economy literature. The idea that lower concen-
tration in the product market might deliver more cooperation in lobbying for protection is already
present in a paper by Pecorino (2001), who develops a model where ￿rms in the sector face a
collective action problem. There is an e¢ cient level of protection, that maximizes the joint sur-
plus of all ￿rms in the sector, but the non-cooperative equilibrium entails a sub-optimal level of
tari⁄s because of free riding. The paper builds an in￿nitely repeated game where the cooperative
equilibrium, with the optimal level of protection, is supported by the threat of reverting to the
non-cooperative equilibrium if a ￿rm deviates. Pecorino shows that, because a higher number of
￿rms causes the level of tari⁄s in the non-cooperative equilibrium to be lower, a less concentrated
sector might ￿nd it easier to enforce the cooperative equilibrium. This result is in line with what
we ￿nd in the data and is related to the theoretical result we present, although the mechanism is
di⁄erent. Moreover, it is not obvious how to justify the e⁄ect of the elasticity of substitution on
political organization in the framework proposed by Pecorino. In a theoretical setting Gordon and
Hafer (2008) analyze informational incentives to jointly lobby a regulatory agency. The empirical
literature (see Hansen et al. (2005), and Potters and Sloof (1996), for a review), emphasizes the
ambiguity of results connecting ￿rm concentration to political in￿ uence, absent direct measures of
political organization4.
Besides providing a novel measure of political organization, we show empirically that sectors
where ￿rms lobby as a trade association obtain a higher level of protection relative to those where
￿rms prevalently lobby individually.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and presents the main
stylized facts. Section 3 presents the model rationalizing these facts. Section 4 describes the e⁄ect
of competition primitives on the equilibrium mode of lobbying and discusses the intuition. Section
5 discusses the e⁄ect of the mode of lobbying on the level of protection. Section 6 concludes.
4Potters and Sloof (1996) report that one of the reasons is that "there are also many interests which have no
formal organization, or membershipdata are unavailable". In their recent study Hansen et al. (2005) investigate the
choice of individual lobbying by a sample of Fortune 1000 ￿rms.
52 Prima facie empirical evidence on the mode of lobbying
The objective of this section is to investigate the relationship between the extent of trade association
lobbying and product market competition. We are interested in showing how the substitutability
of goods within an industry and the degree of concentration within an industry a⁄ect the mode of
lobbying and with what results for collective action.
To the best of our knowledge the evidence for an extensive number of sectors in the U.S. economy
is lacking. We ￿nd this an interesting empirical question as the basic theoretical intuition for the
relationship between exogenous structural/technological characteristics of a market (its industrial
organization) and the incentives towards political organization is a priori ambiguous.
On the one hand, it seems reasonable to think of product market competition as a force towards
political disintegration through strong incentives to undercut competitors and free ride. On the
other hand, a high degree of product market competition may create higher payo⁄s from organized
lobbying, induce stronger incentives towards political organization, and reduce costs of supporting
homogenous policies for the sector.
2.1 The data
We now describe the data employed in the empirical section. A contribution of this paper is
to assemble a large data set of lobbying expenditures for trade policy, the ￿rst one available in
the trade literature to the best of our knowledge. The Lobby Disclosure Act (1995) and, more
recently, the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act (2007) impose strict disclosure rules
for every individual and ￿rm lobbying government.5 The LDA imposes disclosure requirement for
lobbyists, which have to ￿le registration and regular six-month reports indicating not only the
amounts received by companies as compensation for their services, but also issues (among them
international trade) and government agencies lobbied.6
Although substantial attention has been paid in the literature on trade policy and special
interests to political contributions data, lobbying expenditures have not received substantial atten-
tion, mostly because of scarce availability and sparse access to the original source ￿les. Lobbying
5The LDAde￿nes a lobbyist: "Any individual (1) who is either employed or retained by a client for ￿nancial or
other compensation (2) whose services include more than one lobbying contact; and (3) whose lobbying activities
constitute 20 percent or more of his or her services on behalf of that client during any three month period."
6Data available at Senate O¢ ce of Public Records.
6expenditures are however particularly apt to the study of in￿ uence in politics, and particularly in-
ternational trade, for several reasons. First, lobbyists must indicate the issue they are lobbying for
in their reports (both in general and speci￿c legislation), enabling the researcher to isolate lobbying
money spent for speci￿c policy areas. This is not information required or available in any form in
campaign contributions reports, which are simply linked to donations supporting the election of a
speci￿c politician.
Second, lobbying expenditures are substantially larger than political contributions. In 2006
lobbying expenditures were over 2:59 billion dollars versus 345 million donated in campaign con-
tributions for Senate and House combined in the congressional cycle 2005-2006. Third, the vast
majority of lobbying expenditures are undertaken by ￿rms and trade associations and not by
individuals, underlying a clear economic motive in lobbying. This is in contrast with political con-
tributions, where individual campaign donations, which may incorporate ideological and partisan
motives (Ansolabehere et al. (2003)), can a⁄ect the precision of the measure.
We collect the following information from registration and bi-annual report forms available at
the Senate O¢ ce of Public Records: 1) The name of the Client, that is the name of the ￿rm or trade
association paying for the lobbying services; 2) The name of the Registrant, that is the lobbying
￿rm providing the services, and the name of each of the speci￿c individual lobbyists engaged for
each issue; 3) The Issue lobbied (out of 77 potential issues such as agriculture, aerospace, insurance,
budget, etc.). All years from 1998 to 2008 are available, but we restrict our sample to the period
1999-2001.
Unfortunately, public information concerning lobbying clients (￿rms) lacks any form of standard
company identi￿er and, to the best of our knowledge,a standard identi￿er of trade associations in
the U.S. does not exist. We match ￿rms and trade associations to sectors identi￿ers (4-digit
level Standard Industrial Classi￿cation, SIC, or 3-digit SIC) individually using variety of sources
including Compustat, the registration form itself (in the subsection General Description of Client￿ s
Business), company web sites, online business directories (Goliath, Manta, and Websters Online).
Out of the 3;466 unique client entries we were able to successfully identify and match to speci￿c
SIC codes 3;448 of them, for a total of 111;156 unique registrant-client-year-issue entries.7 We
then collapsed the data at the sector level, to obtain total lobbying expenditures, and lobbying
7The number of total unique client entries in the data set, including all 77 issues, is 29;831. The total number of
unique client-registrant-year-issue entries in the data is 312;908:
7expenditure by type of client (individual ￿rm or trade association, both foreign and domestic) from
which we construct IndFraci; the share of total lobbying expenditure done by individual ￿rms in
industry i: Particularly, the share of total lobbying expenditure done by individual ￿rms as opposed
to trade associations is a very accurate measure of the strength of collective action within a sector
in the sense of Olson (1965). Interestingly the vast majority of U.S. sectors engages in some form
of lobbying at some point in time. More than 84 percent of sectors engage in lobbying for the trade
issue (which is one of the 77 issues listed by the SOPR) during the period 1998-2008.
We collected the sectorial characteristics data from a variety of sources. From the National
Bureau of Economic Research Manufacturing Industry Productivity Database we obtain the total
employment and physical capital stock measures employed to compute the capital/labor ratios
at the sectorial level (averaged over the 1986-96 period). From the same source we also obtain
total shipments. We obtain elasticities of substitution, Elasti; from Broda and Weinstein (2006),
which we use in their original format and we also discretized in three tercile-speci￿c dummies (low,
medium and high elasticity of substitution) in order to partially control for measurement error in
the estimates. We also follow the literature (Goldberg and Maggi (1999)) in not allowing correction
in the empirical analysis for the fact that the variable is estimated. Conci is our preferred measure
of concentration (share of output produced by largest 4 ￿rms), number of establishments, and total
shipments are available from the 1997 Economic Census (Release Date: 12/17/2002). The controls
for geographic and political concentration are obtained from Busch and Reinhardt (1999). These
controls are particularly apt for our study, since they not only measure geographic concentration,
but also distinguish between industries whose activities are geographically clustered from industries
whose clusters also fall within the same political district (and hence potentially have more political
clout). The data on the number of tari⁄ lines per harmonized system code at the 8 and 10 digit
are from Feenstra et al. (2002).
We report summary statistics in Table 1. Concerning our main variable of interest IndFraci,
one can notice that a good fraction of sectors displays high levels of individual lobbying. Indeed,
the density of IndFraci is bimodal. The fraction of sectors with a fraction above 90 percent
of total lobbying done at the trade association level roughly varies between 15 and 20 percent
depending on the set of available covariates (the table reports summary statistics for the smallest
sample for which all covariates are available, corresponding to speci￿cation (6) in Table 2). The
fraction of sectors with a fraction above 90 percent of lobbying done at the individual level roughly
8varies between 40 and 55 percent. On average a dichotomous variable for the sector lobbying
predominantly at the trade association versus individual level would accurately describe two thirds
of our sample. Another important ￿gure to notice is that for the period 1999-2001 the total amount
of lobbying expenditure for international trade were on average $630;000 per sector, almost twice
as the aggregate campaign contributions for Senate and House combined in the congressional cycle
2005-2006. This gives an idea of the economic relevance of focusing on lobbying expenditure for
trade policy. For completeness we also report summary statistics concerning measures of protection
and our complete set of measures of product market competition.
2.2 Empirical evidence
Let us de￿ne the following variables for i indicating a 4-digit Standard Industrial Classi￿cation
sector: IndFraci share of total lobbying expenditure done by individual ￿rms in sector i; Elasti
elasticity of substitution or dummy for low, medium and high elasticity of substitution (from Broda
and Weinstein (2006)); Conci is a measure of concentration (share of output produced by largest
4 ￿rms). The speci￿cation that we estimate is:
IndFraci = ￿0 + ￿1Elasti + ￿2Conci + Xi + ￿i (1)
where the control set is indicated by Xi and includes capital to labor ratio and average ￿rm size,
which can also be interpreted as proxy for product market competition in the sector and other
variables discussed later.
The nature of the dependent variable is such that censoring occurs naturally over the unit
interval. For this reason we estimate (1) using a Tobit two-sided censoring in all speci￿cations. All
the standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust.
In Table 2 we report estimates of the reduce-form speci￿cation (1) both in the form of marginal
e⁄ects on the latent variable (upper panel) and marginal e⁄ects on the observed variable (lower
panel). The ￿rst set of estimates provides insight on the size of theoretical e⁄ect on the latent
unobserved variable, while the marginal e⁄ects in the lower panel quantify the e⁄ect conditional
on observing the censored realization of the left-hand-side variable.
We begin by imposing ￿2 = 0 in order to study the simple correlation of elasticity of substitution
and mode of lobbying. Column (1) of Table 2 reports the estimates of the relationship between the
share of total lobbying expenditure done by individual ￿rms in industry i; IndFraci; and dummies
9variables for medium and low elasticity of substitution in the sector (leaving low elasticity as
contrast group). From a quantitative standpoints the e⁄ects are sizable. Using the marginal e⁄ects
on the latent variable (upper panel of Table 2) column (1) shows that going from high/medium
to low elasticity produces an increase in the fraction of lobbying done at ￿rm level increases by
28:2%. Starting from the mean elasticity of substitution, a decrease by one standard deviation in
the elasticity produces an increment of IndFrac of about 3%. Using the marginal e⁄ects (lower
panel of Table 2) column (1) shows that going from high/medium to low elasticity produces an
increase in the fraction of lobbying done at ￿rm level increases by 5:5%. The estimates are smaller
in the lower panel has they are rescaled for the probability of IndFrac falling in the unit interval.
In column (2) we re-estimate (1) with the restriction ￿2 = 0 but using a continuous variable for
elasticity of substitution with similar results. Starting from the mean elasticity of substitution a
decrease by one standard deviation in the elasticity produces an increment of IndFrac of about
0:6%.
There is also widespread evidence of a positive degree of correlation between standard product
market concentration measures (Conci) and the share of total lobbying expenditure done by indi-
vidual ￿rms in industry. We employ the fraction of total shipments covered by the top four ￿rms
, the capital/labor ratio (as proxy for entry barriers in the sector) and average ￿rm size in the
industry. Columns (3)-(5) report a statistically signi￿cant degree of positive correlation between
concentration and political dispersion (i.e. lack of predominantly association-based lobbying) when
imposing ￿1 = 0.
We then include all product market competition proxies (both Elasti and Conci) in the ￿nal
columns of Table 2, in columns (6) and (7) where we employ dummy variables and continuous
variables for the elasticity of substitution. Higher elasticity of substitution parameters, lower con-
centration and lower capital intensity of the sector strongly predict higher lobbying through trade
associations, as opposed to individual lobbying. F-tests, not reported, strongly reject the null of no
explanatory power for our set of measures of competition. In the ￿nal two columns of Table 2 we
also report the reduced-form correlations between all the measures of competitions and the total
amount of resources spent in lobbying in the sector. Interestingly the e⁄ects of higher elasticity of
substitution parameters of the sector strongly predicts lower levels of lobbying, suggesting that the
same sectors where lobbying goes through trade associations also undertake less lobbying.8
8The unconditional correlation between IndFraci and total lobbying expenditure is positive, but small (in Table
10In Table (3) we introduce a set of controls to speci￿cation (1) for robustness. In the speci￿cation
we include two Her￿ndhal indexes for political and geographic concentration; the logarithm of total
shipments in the sector; the number of HS8 tari⁄ lines; a SIC level-1 ￿xed e⁄ect covering the
2000-groups of manufacturing industries.9 Although limited, this set of covariates captures a wide
spectrum of systematic determinants of lobbying e⁄orts across-sectors. In particular, the omission
of sector size or its geographic dispersion could be well biasing the estimates in Table 2. A very
reassuring feature of Table 3 is the increase in the size of the estimated marginal e⁄ects when the
set of controls is added. Given the relative exogeneity of the technological and structural sectorial
characteristics approximating for product market competition, the omission of relevant variables
correlated with competition seems to be the main potential confounding factor in interpreting ￿1
and ￿2: However, a clear indication of the potential relevance of omitted variables would be the
presence of substantial drops in the size of ￿1 and ￿2 whenever alternative controls were added, as
this would indicate that elasticity of substitution and competition were likely capturing variation
pertinent to alternative factors. This could likely happen when employing even a small but diverse
spectrum of controls such ours.10 At the opposite, we ￿nd larger e⁄ects, suggesting that omission
of variables does not appear to be a ￿rst order concern for our reduced-form estimates.
3 The model
3.1 Set up
Consider an economy with a measure one of consumers, each supplying one unit of labor. Prefer-
























2 sample it is 0:17).
9Included in the 2000 group for Manufacturing are: Food And Kindred Products; Tobacco Products; Textile Mill
Products; Apparel And Other Finished Products Made From Fabrics And Similar Materials; Lumber And Wood
Products, Except Furniture; Furniture And Fixtures; Paper And Allied Products; Printing, Publishing, And Allied
Industries; Chemicals And Allied Products; Petroleum Re￿ning And Related Industries.
10We checked the robustness of our speci￿cation to a much wider set of controls, including employment, input
costs, productivity, etc., with similar results.
11where q0 is consumption of a homogeneous good, chosen as numeraire (with an international and
domestic price of one), and Qi is consumption of a variety of di⁄erentiated good, with i = 1;:::;N.11
The parameters of the utility function, ￿ and ￿ are positive, while 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1. We assume throughout































where pi is the price of variety i. For analytical convenience we choose the parameterization
proposed by Singh and Vives (1984), where ￿ describes the substitutability among varieties. As
￿ increases, demand for variety i becomes more elastic with respect to all prices, but it becomes
relatively more elastic with respect to the prices of varieties other than i. For ￿ = 0 there is no
substitution among varieties, while for ￿ = 1 all varieties are perfect substitutes. One feature of
interest is that the derivative of demand for variety i with respect to other prices is increasing in
N.12 In this sense the number of varieties N a⁄ects the substitutability of di⁄erentiated goods
in a fashion similar to ￿. Furthermore this e⁄ect is stronger the larger ￿ is. Demand for the
homogeneous good is q0 = I ￿
N P
i=1
piQi, where I is income. Under these preferences, indirect utility
V takes the form:






































The numeraire good is produced under constant returns to scale using one unit of labor per unit
of output and supplied by a competitive sector. We assume that the production of the numeraire
good is positive, so that the wage is equal to one and that this good does not bear any tari⁄s or
subsidies. The production of di⁄erentiated goods is undertaken by domestic and foreign ￿rms. Each
variety Qi is produced by only two ￿rms: one domestic and one foreign. In this economy therefore
each domestic ￿rm faces the competition of a foreign rival that produces an identical product. All
￿rms bear a constant marginal cost of ￿ units of labor per unit of the di⁄erentiated good. On top
of the production cost, foreign ￿rm i can be charged a speci￿c tari⁄13 T + ti, which we discuss
11We follow Ottaviano, Tabushi and Thisse (2002) and Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) in modelling product di⁄er-
entiation through a quadratic utility function. Like in these papers, the choice is driven by analytical tractability.
































pj=(N ￿ 1). It is easy to verify that
dQi







13We follow the literature in focusing on speci￿c tari⁄s, as ad valorem tari⁄s are analytically less tractable.
12below. We assume Bertrand competition among all producers of the di⁄erentiated goods. In the
presence of positive tari⁄s, Bertrand competition among producers of identical goods guarantees
that the domestic ￿rm will choose a limit price
pi = ￿ + T + ti (4)
as long as this is below the equilibrium price that would prevail in the absence of foreign competi-
tors.14 We assume throughout that we are operating at a level of tari⁄s such that limit pricing
prevails. Imports of di⁄erentiated goods are always zero in this model.15 Substituting the limit































ti. Having calculated pro￿ts, we can ￿nd income I by adding up pro￿ts across
￿rms and labor income, which is one because both the population and the wage are equal to one:




There are no tari⁄revenues in this economy because of limit pricing and no imports. Replacing (5)
in (3), we can express the indirect utility as a function of tari⁄s, V (t1;:::;tN;T), by substituting
the limit price (4) in the resulting expression for V .
Producers of di⁄erentiated goods not only interact in the product market, but also decide on
whether to organize politically to in￿ uence the level of tari⁄s, on which their pro￿ts depend.
In this economy the government is a unitary agent that has the ability to set tari⁄s.16 The
government￿ s objective function includes aggregate welfare as well as services provided by lobbyists
which we assume are proportional to the lobbying expenditures made by ￿rms:





















15The stark feature of no imports can be avoided by adopting Cournot competition. Although we have solved the
model under this mode of competition the algebra is cumbersome and the qualitatively features are unchanged, so
we present the version with Bertrand competition, despite its unappealing prediction of zero imports.
16Richer models of lobbying that incorporate a more realistic view of government have been explored by Helpman
and Persson (2001) and Hauk Jr (2005). These models take into account that policy decisions are made by legislatures
operating under majority rule and emphasize the e⁄ect of lobbying on di⁄erent political systems.
13where L is the amount spent on lobbying by the trade association and l is the aggregate amount
spent on lobbying by individual ￿rms.
In Grossman and Helpman (1994), and the related literature, the government is assumed to care
about welfare and political contributions, which are useful to the incumbent politicians because
they increase the probability of re-election. In this paper we study lobbying expenditures, which
are not directly channeled to the politician, but to lobbyists. According to a large amount of
anecdotal evidence lobbyists provide many services to politicians such as producing documents,
drafting legislation, providing expert testimony and even organizing campaign events.17 There are
many papers formally analyzing the role of informational lobbying in policy making (Grossman and
Helpman (2001), Potters and Van Winden (1990), Potters and Winden (1992) and Austen-Smith
(1993)). In this paper we take an approach that is in between these two strands of literature. On
the one hand, we move away from the view that interest groups provide just money to politicians in
exchange for policies and recognize that lobbyists provide other useful services to politicians such
as information. On the other hand, we do not formalize the game in terms of a signalling game,
primarily because we would not have a way of directly relating it to the data. Indeed, a drawback
of signalling models is that they are very hard to test empirically. For the purpose of this paper
we accept that lobbying services describe part of the interaction between politicians and interest
groups, but we limit ourselves to a reduced form that links the amount of lobbying activity and
the utility of politicians.
Expression (6) allows the trade-o⁄ between the amount of lobbying services and aggregate
welfare to depend on the source of lobbying services. This is meant to capture the fact that trade
associations might be more or less e⁄ective at lobbying the government than individual ￿rms. If ￿
is low relative to ￿ then trade association lobbying is more e⁄ective than individual ￿rm lobbying
and viceversa if ￿ > ￿. We do not provide a microfoundation of the reason why ￿ 7 ￿, leaving it to
future work to explore theoretically the e⁄ectiveness of di⁄erent modes of lobbying.
17The evidence on the matter is widespread and it is not uncommon to ￿nd quotes such as "Mr. McCain has
accepted corporate contributions for pet projects and relied heavily on lobbyists to help run his campaigns and Senate
o¢ ce." (New York Times, April 25, 2008).
143.2 Structure of the lobbying game
The structure of the game is sequential.18 The timing of the game is the following:
Stage 1 (Lobbying together): Each ￿rm i simultaneously sets Li (contributions to trade
association lobbying expenditures). The trade association makes a take-or-leave o⁄er (T;L) to the
government, with L =
N P
i=1
Li. The government accepts or rejects the o⁄er.
Stage 2 (Lobbying alone): given the sector-wide tari⁄negotiated by the trade association T,
each ￿rm i simultaneously makes a take-or-leave o⁄er (ti;li) to the government. The government
accepts or rejects the o⁄ers.
Stage 3: Production and consumption take place
We solve the game backward starting from stage 3. We have already described the interaction
among ￿rms in the product market and we have found the variables that are relevant for the
previous stages of the game, pro￿ts ￿i (t1;:::;tN;T) and aggregate welfare V (t1;:::;tN;T).
3.3 Lobbying alone
At stage 2, T has been determined and individual ￿rms consider whether to lobby to increase the
tari⁄ on their own product. This means we are limiting the strategy space for each individual ￿rm
i to ti. Throughout we are going to impose that ti ￿ 0 and li ￿ 0 (individual ￿rms cannot ￿undo￿
T and reduce the tari⁄ on their own product). At this stage the government problem is to accept
or reject the o⁄ers made by individual ￿rms. In particular the government might accept any subset
of the o⁄ers, so we need to understand whether we can limit the set of equilibrium strategies of the
government. Let us denote the set of ￿rms whose o⁄ers are accepted by NA. Thanks to symmetry
we can order ￿rms so that the ￿rst NA are the ones whose o⁄ers are accepted. Then the government












Lemma 1 In equilibrium all o⁄ers are accepted, i.e. NA = N.
Proof. In Appendix.
18We have characterized the solution for the simultaneous game as well and, although the tari⁄ levels are the same,
the equilibrium mode of lobbying depends on parameters in a slightly di⁄erent way. Nevertheless the basic results of
comparative statics with respect to the degree of substitutability and the number of ￿rms are the same. Overall, the
main di⁄erence is that the simultaneous game allows a larger set of parameters where joint lobbying prevails.
15Let us provide here the intuition for this Lemma, with all the details relegated to the Appendix.
Imagine that there is only one ￿rm, ￿rm 1, whose o⁄er is accepted by the government. Firm 1 asks
for tari⁄ t and o⁄ers l1 = ￿￿(V (t;0;:::;0;T) ￿ V (0;:::;0;T)). If ￿rm 1 ￿nds this pro￿table then
￿rm 2, identical to ￿rm 1, will have even higher incentives to ask for the same tari⁄ t, since the
government will need a lower amount of lobbying expenditures to be compensated. This is because
the ￿rst tari⁄ on an individual variety produces a large distortion in relative prices, while the tari⁄
on the second product does not distort them as much and so on. This means that if any ￿rm has
incentive to make an o⁄er that will be accepted (and for ￿ low enough there will always be a tari⁄
that is small enough to be worth obtaining), then all ￿rms will have an incentive to make o⁄ers
that will be accepted. So the government never ￿nds accepting only one o⁄er to be optimal, if all
￿rms ask for the same tari⁄ t and o⁄er no more than l1 (if one of them did, the government would
be strictly better o⁄ accepting that o⁄er only).
Lemma 1 and the fact that ￿rms make take-or-leave o⁄ers imply that the only constraint ￿rms
have to take into account when choosing (ti;li) is that they must keep the government indi⁄erent
between free trade and accepting all o⁄ers:
N P
i=1
li + ￿V (t1;:::;tN;T) = ￿V (0;:::;0;T) (7)
Constraint (7) is binding otherwise ￿rms could decrease the amount of lobbying expenditures
without a⁄ecting the government￿ s decision and strictly gain.
Firm i￿ s problem is therefore to maximize pro￿ts minus lobbying expenditures, taking as given








lj = ￿￿[V (t1;:::;tN;T) ￿ V (0;:::;0;T)]








Notice that this implies that the ￿rm will choose the tari⁄ ti that maximizes the joint surplus of
the government and the ￿rm itself, given the tari⁄ and lobbying expenditures of all other ￿rms.
16We take the ￿rst order conditions for all ￿rms and solve for the Nash equilibrium tari⁄ levels and
lobbying expenditures.











￿(N￿3￿￿). Lobbying expenditures l￿




i + ￿V (t￿
1;:::;t￿
N;T) =
￿V (0;:::;0;T) and l￿
i ￿ ￿￿[V (0;:::;ti;:::;0;T) ￿ V (0;:::;0;T)]:
The indeterminacy of lobbying expenditures is a common characteristics of this class of games
(such as Grossman and Helpman (1994)) where the government has an objective function linear in
lobbying expenditures and utility of consumers is quasi-linear. In order to proceed to Stage 1 we
need to make assumptions that restrict the level of equilibrium lobbying expenditures. The presence
of identical ￿rms suggests as reasonable the assumption of symmetry in the lobbying expenditures,
which we make here.
Assumption 1 - The amount of lobbying expenditure at Stage 2 is identical across ￿rms:
l￿
i = ￿ ￿
N [V (t￿
1;:::;t￿
N;T) ￿ V (0;:::;0;T)]
Before moving to stage 1 of the game, it is worth remarking how ￿, which represents the
incentive to lobby individually for protection beyond the level achieved by the trade association,
depends negatively on the substitutability parameter. As ￿ approaches 1 the desired level of
individual tari⁄￿ declines because every attempt to raise individual prices translates into a smaller
increase in pro￿ts. Moreover, notice that ￿ depends negatively on the number of ￿rms N: As N
approaches in￿nity the desired level of individual tari⁄s goes to 0 because any attempt to raise the
individual tari⁄ causes consumers to divert spending to the larger set of competing varieties.
3.4 Lobbying together
At stage 1 of the game ￿rms decide how much to contribute to the lobbying expenditures by the
trade association representing the sector. We adopt a very stylized and somewhat mechanical view
of the trade association. We see the trade association as a ￿ technology￿that transforms lobbying
expenditures into a common tari⁄ T at a rate ￿ that might be di⁄erent from ￿. The timing of the
game and the strategy space for the ￿rms will deliver free-riding in the sense that the level of T
achieved is not the cooperative level. This is a desired feature in our view because free-riding is one
17of the fundamental aspects of the trade o⁄ between individual and joint lobbying. This is meant to
capture the idea that ￿rms evaluate whether to contribute to their own tari⁄ or to the sector-wide
tari⁄. While, in some cases, they might prefer all tari⁄s to be raised simultaneously, when they
contribute a dollar to lobbying expenditures of the trade association, they perceive its return to be
spread over all goods and therefore they tend to contribute less. If the trade association achieved
the cooperative level of T then there would be no need for ￿rms to lobby for their individual ti.
Each ￿rm i contributes Li to the trade association. The trade association makes a take-or-
leave o⁄er to the government (T;L). The government problem is to accept or not the o⁄er. The
government will accept the o⁄er if the o⁄er makes it at least as well o⁄ as the status quo (free
trade):
L + ￿V (0;:::;0;T) ￿ ￿V (0;:::;0;0) (8)
The trade association will lower L until constraint (8) binds for a given T otherwise it would
bene￿t without modifying the government￿ s behavior. From this binding constraint we can derive
a function T (L) that relates the amount of lobbying expenditures to the level of tari⁄ T. Firm i￿ s
problem is then to ￿nd the level of Li that maximizes pro￿ts net of lobbying expenditures, given






￿i (t1(T);:::;T) ￿ li (T) ￿ Li (9)
with T = T (Li + L￿i) (10)
Because of perfect substitutability between ti and T and the assumption of symmetry, this
problem entails corner solutions. Either all ￿rms lobby alone (ti > 0 8i and T = 0) or they all
lobby together (ti = 0 8i and T > 0). Section 7.2 in the Appendix provides a rigorous description
of the equilibrium. Here we brie￿ y describe the outcomes under the two modes of lobbying.
If ti = 0 then the problem for ￿rm i simpli￿es to the following:
max
T
￿i (0;:::;T) + ￿ [V (0;:::;T) ￿ V (0;:::;0)] + L￿i (11)




Notice that this level of tari⁄ is privately e¢ cient from the point of view of ￿rm i because it
maximizes the joint surplus of the ￿rm and the government. This is an extreme level of free-riding,
18which could be relaxed, but serves as a stark benchmark, for the reasons discussed above. While
the tari⁄ level T is uniquely determined, along with the total amount of lobbying expenditure L,
the amount of individual lobbying expenditures Li cannot be pinned down. How ￿rms share L
is relevant for the incentives of ￿rms to deviate from joint lobbying, as described in the sections
below.
If ti > 0 then the overall tari⁄ on all goods is ￿. If we substitute ti + T = ￿ in the objective







[V (0;:::;￿) ￿ V (0;:::;T)] + ￿ [V (0;:::;T) ￿ V (0;:::;0)] + L￿i (12)





V (0;:::;T). It is easy
to verify that this is a linear problem that delivers corner solutions. Either T is set to 0 or it
is increased to a point at which ￿rms no longer have incentives to lobby individually. If ￿ < ￿
N
then lobbying by the trade association is very e⁄ective and ti = 0. If ￿ > ￿
N then we need to
consider other parameters of the problem to determine the equilibrium mode of lobbying and the
tari⁄ level. We refer to section 7.2 in the appendix for a full description of the equilibrium. In the
following sections we discuss the characterization of the equilibrium as function of two parameters
that describe the level of product market competition in the economy, the degree of substitutability,
￿, and the level of concentration, N.
4 Competition and the mode of lobbying
4.1 Substitutability
We present here an immediate corollary to proposition 8, which characterizes the equilibrium in
terms of ￿. The following corollary describes the equilibrium in terms of the substitutability
parameter ￿, one of the determinants of ￿ and one of the parameters we are interested in. In order
to provide intuition we con￿ne the analysis to the case with N = 2, referring the reader to the
general proposition in the appendix. De￿ne ￿ as the share of trade association lobbying expenditure
L by ￿rm 1.
Corollary 3 With N = 2, the equilibrium in the lobbying game depends on ￿, ￿ and ￿:
1. If ￿ ￿ ￿
2 then all ￿rms lobby together with T￿ = T =
￿￿￿
2(1+￿)
192. If ￿ > ￿
2, there exist ￿ and ￿ such that:
(a) if ￿ < ￿ then all ￿rms lobby alone and t￿









(b) if ￿ ￿ ￿ < ￿ then there are multiple equilibria in the mode of lobbying and the level of
lobbying expenditures. In one equilibrium all ￿rms lobby alone with t￿
i = ￿. In the other
equilibrium all ￿rms lobby together with T￿ = T and ￿(￿) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ (￿).
(c) if ￿ ￿ ￿ then all ￿rms lobby together with T￿ = T and 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1
3. ￿(￿) is decreasing in ￿ and ￿ (￿) is increasing in ￿.
Figure 1 illustrates the equilibrium in Proposition 2 for ￿ > ￿
2. Notice that there exists an ￿￿
such that for ￿ < ￿￿, ￿ > T and for ￿ ￿ ￿￿, ￿ ￿ T, but such value of ￿ turns out not to be a
qualitative threshold for the equilibrium mode of lobbying.
Proof. In Appendix.
Corollary 3 establishes that industries characterized by high substitutability among products are
more likely to organize into a trade association, while industries where products are di⁄erentiated
are expected to lobby individually. This is because the more substitutable products are, the lower
the increase in pro￿t an increase in ti induces, making lobbying for T a better alternative. The
next section analyzes how concentration a⁄ects the equilibrium mode of lobbying.
4.2 Concentration: Homogeneous Firms
This section shows how a higher degree of competition in the form of a larger number of ￿rms N
can lead to lobbying together as the equilibrium. As opposed to the case of the substitutability
parameter, where the relationship between mode of lobbying and product di⁄erentiation is un-
ambiguous, here the number of ￿rms has two e⁄ects on the mode of lobbying. The ￿rst, which
we refer to as Free-Riding E⁄ect, has been described in a number of papers about the collective
action problem, starting with Olson (1965). As N increases, the free-riding problem in the trade
association becomes more severe because each ￿rm is smaller and internalizes less the bene￿ts of
an increase in T. This e⁄ect makes an industry characterized by a small concentration less likely to
lobby jointly. The second, which we refer to as Competition E⁄ect, is similar to the one described
in the previous section. As the number of ￿rms N increases, an attempt by one ￿rm to increase
its product-speci￿c tari⁄ causes a smaller increase in pro￿ts. This is not just because the ￿rm
20itself is smaller and therefore the increase in pro￿ts is smaller, but because as the price of one
variety increases consumers can choose among many other varieties. If we take the symmetric case
(identical prices p), the shape of the demand function for Qi, as in equation (2), reveals that as N
increases, the coe¢ cient in front of prices of other varieties increases, while the coe¢ cient in front
of the price for variety i is constant. This means that the demand for Qi becomes more elastic to
the prices of other varieties with an increase in N. The Competition E⁄ect makes an increase in the
individual tari⁄ less pro￿table relative to an increase in T and therefore can make joint lobbying
more likely as the number of ￿rms rises. This section illustrates the parameter conditions under
which the Competition E⁄ect is stronger than the Free-Riding E⁄ect. The full characterization of
the equilibrium is cumbersome and not informative about the role of N because many of the cases
depend on the value of ￿ which we have discussed in the previous section. We provide it in Section
7.4 in the Appendix. We report here a key part of the proposition, which shows that in this model
the olsonian intuition that less concentrated sectors are less likely to organize politically might fail.
Remark 4 For ￿ < ￿ <
￿





￿, concentration a⁄ects the equilibrium mode of lobbying
according to the following pattern: there exist e N1 and e N2 with e N1 < e N2 such that all ￿rms lobby
alone for N < e N1, all ￿rms lobby together for N > e N2 and there are multiple equilibria for
e N1 ￿ N ￿ e N2.
We can build intuition for this result around two key conditions. First, the cost of lobbying
together ￿ has to be high enough relative to the cost of lobbying alone ￿ to justify the presence
of lobbying alone as an equilibrium. Second, there are conditions on the parameters for this cost
advantage of lobbying alone to be eroded as N increases. This is the case if ￿ is large. As varieties
are more substitutable an increase in their number makes demand faced by an individual ￿rm
even more sensitive to prices. Therefore an attempt to raise the individual tari⁄ will cause them
to substitute to other varieties, making lobbying individually progressively less attractive with an
increase in N. This produces the result.
5 Evidence on the e⁄ect of the mode of lobbying on tari⁄s
One question that we have left unexplored in the paper is whether the mode of lobbying has any
e⁄ect on policy outcomes, in the case of trade policy the level of protection. In this section we
present some evidence that the mode of lobbying has an e⁄ect on the level of protection granted to
21a sector. In the model whether di⁄erent modes of lobbying have an impact on protection depends
simply on the parameters ￿ and ￿. The lower ￿ is relative to ￿, the more e⁄ective resources
spent on lobbying together are relative to lobbying individually, because the government values
lobbying expenditures from trade associations more than from individual ￿rms. We do not provide
a theoretical foundation for the di⁄erential impact of the two modes of lobbying, which could be
the focus of future research, but limit ourselves to investigate this e⁄ect empirically. The empirical
speci￿cation that we employ is the following:
Protectioni = ￿0 + ￿1Elasti + ￿2Conci + ￿3IndFraci + ￿4ImpElasti + ￿5ImpPeneti + ￿i
where Protectioni is either tari⁄s or non-tari⁄ barriers (NTB￿ s)19 in sector i, ImpElasti is the
elasticity of imports in sector i and ImpPeneti is import penetration in sector i. This speci￿cation
does not derive directly from the model, but it takes into account that the level of protection should
be negatively impacted by the degree of substitutability (￿ in the model) and positively related to
the level of concentration. Since the model is too simple and does not describe the general case
of many asymmetric ￿rms, we approximate the relations between these variables in a linear way.
The parameters ￿1 and ￿2 therefore do not have any structural interpretation, although the model
clearly predicts their sign. To test whether the mode of lobbying impacts the the level of protection
we include IndFraci as a regressor. We include also two variables that Tre￿ er (1993) has shown
to have an impact on tari⁄s and NTB￿ s: import penetration20 and import elasticity.21
Since the variables that a⁄ect the mode of lobbying in the model also a⁄ect the level of protec-
tion, we need to ￿nd a source of exogenous variation to identify the e⁄ect of IndFraci. We propose
to employ geographical and political concentration as an instruments for the mode of lobbying. The
logic is that geographically concentrated sectors should ￿nd it easier to form a trade association
to lobby the government. We also follow Tre￿ er (1993), Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) and
Goldberg and Maggi (1999) in recognizing that import penetration is in turn a⁄ected by tari⁄s and
therefore employ determinants of comparative advantage as instruments, in particular the capital
19Weighted tari⁄s for the year 1999 and are taken from Feenstra et al. (2002). Coverage ratios are built from
the TRAINS data set maintained by UNCTAD. Coverage ratios are the fraction of products within each SIC sector
coverege by one or more non-tari⁄ measures (non-tari⁄ measures are applied most often at the HS10 level, so we
count the number of products within each SIC category that are covered). Weighted coverage ratios are similar but
attach a weight to each product equal to its share of imports.
20Import penetration data for the year 1999 are from Feenstra et al. (2002).
21Import elasticities are from Kee et al. (2004).
22to labor ratio, the skilled to unskilled labor ratio and material to labor ratio.22
The results of the OLS and instrumental variable regressions are reported in Table 4. The
main ￿nding is that, ceteris paribus, the higher the share of individual lobbying in total lobbying
expenditure, the lower tari⁄s and NTB￿ s are. The result is present in both the OLS and 2SLS
regressions, but is stronger in the latter. Quantitatively the e⁄ects are substantial. In the baseline
2SLS speci￿cations a one standard deviation increase in the share of trade association lobbying
(0:4) produces and increase of 37:7% in the level of unweighted NTB￿ s (column 4), of 31:5% in the
level of weighted NTB￿ s (column 5) and an increase in tari⁄s of 5:4%.
The interpretation of this result according to the model is that the politician￿ s weight on trade
associations expenditures is higher than the weight on individual ￿rms lobbying expenditures, that
is ￿ is smaller than ￿. For the model to be consistent with all empirical ￿ndings, this parameter
con￿guration should be compatible with the parameter restrictions required by the results on
substitutability and concentration. As for substitutability, the model requires ￿ to be larger than
￿
N for joint lobbying to be more likely as substitutability among products ￿ increases (if ￿ < ￿
N
then lobbying together is always the only mode of lobbying regardless of ￿). This restriction is
compatible with ￿ < ￿. As for the result of the e⁄ect of concentration on joint lobbying, the
evidence is more problematic because an increase in N makes joint lobbying more likely only in
the case of ￿ > ￿. Since we observe that, empirically, as concentration decreases joint lobbying is
more likely the model would require ￿ to be larger than ￿. There are two reasons to consider this
contrasting evidence not a serious ￿ aw of the model. First, we are inferring the relative magnitude
of ￿ and ￿ from an equation that is not structurally related to the model. Second, the theoretical
result on the e⁄ect of concentration on the mode of lobbying should be taken more as an illustration
that the olsonian intuition can fail, rather than identifying precisely the instances in which it does
or does not fail.
As for the rest of Table 4, we ￿nd the expected sign on the relationship between protection and
the remaining variables. Both import elasticity and the elasticity of substitution among products
within the sector are negatively related to protection and concentration is shown to increase pro-
tection. The sign of the coe¢ cient on the import penetration variable is negative. This ￿nding is
in line with the Grossman and Helpman (1994) theoretical prediction that sectors that are politi-
22The data is from the NBER Manufacturing Industry Productivity Database. Capital is capital stock, skilled
labor is the number of non-production workers, unskilled labor is the number of production workers, and materials
is the expendiure on materials, including energy and fuels. All variables are an average over the period 1986-96.
23cally organized should receive a level of protection that is negatively related to import penetration
because of the higher distortion created in these sectors.23
The evidence indicates that ￿rms that manage to lobby jointly through a trade association have a
higher return on their lobbying e⁄orts. In future work we plan to explore why trade associations are
more e⁄ective than individual ￿rms in obtaining favorable legislation. One possible explanation is
based on theories of informational lobbying. If one accepts that a trade association has preferences
that are more aligned with the government than individual ￿rms, then the amount of lobbying
expenditure required to obtain a certain level of protection is lower. Another possible explanation
is that politicians ￿nd information provided by trade associations lobbyists more useful than that
provided by individual ￿rms.
An interesting implication of this ￿nding is that sectors that have high elasticity of substitution
might end up with higher protection than other sectors because they have a higher incentive to lobby
through the trade association and lobbying through the trade association is more e⁄ective. This
could partially explain why sectors such as agriculture, where products are relatively homogeneous,
receive high degrees of protection: the direct e⁄ect of the elasticity of substitution would be to
lower tari⁄s granted, but the indirect e⁄ect of favoring joint lobbying might increase tari⁄s so that
the net e⁄ect can be positive.
6 Concluding remarks
This paper presents a direct new measure of the degree of political organization of U.S. industries
for the purpose of lobbying the federal government for trade policy employing the whole universe
of lobbying reports at the Senate O¢ ce of Public Records. The paper documents that more
23Tre￿ er (1993) ￿nds a positive e⁄ect of import penetration on tari⁄s, but our result should not be read as in
contrast with his ￿nding. Grossman and Helpman (1994) predict that the sign should be negative for politically
organized sectors and positive for politically unorganized sectors and various tests of their tari⁄ equation (Goldberg
and Maggi (1999) and Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000)) have con￿rmed this prediction. Naturally, if one does
not distinguish between two groups then the coe⁄cient is expected to be negative or positive depending on the share
of politically organizes sectors. We do not have a structural tari⁄ equation analogous to Grossman and Helpman
(1994) and we do not make the distinction between politically organized and not politically organized since according
to our data all sectors lobby for trade, although with di⁄erent strength and the distinction is in reality not so stark
(see Bombardini (2008)). Therefore our regression result should be read similarly to Tre￿ er (1993), in that it the
coe¢ cient represent an average of positive and negative e⁄ects.
24competitive and less concentrated sectors are more likely to organize politically and lobby together
as a trade association. The stylized facts we present contrast with the interpretation of free riding as
the prevalent force shaping political organization and collective action (Olson, 1965). We argue that
the choice of mode of lobbying that we observe in the data is consistent with a model incorporating
market interaction among ￿rms within an imperfectly competitive setting. Examples in which
product market competition induces political organization arise naturally in our model. Individual
lobbying becomes less and less useful in settings where price increases induce large pro￿t losses or in
settings where the size or the number of competitors is large. This contrasts with the Olsonian view
that sees individual lobbying and free riding becoming more and more likely in settings where the
size or the number of competitors is large. The main contribution of the paper is to show empirically
and theoretically that competition forces do not necessarily imply political disintegration.
Finally, we also explore the policy implications of di⁄erences in the mode of lobbying for trade
policy. We ￿nd that the mode of lobbying correlates with the level of protection in a large cross-
section of U.S. sectors and, particularly, that sectors with more lobbying done through trade asso-
ciations obtain higher tari⁄s and higher non-tari⁄ measures.
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287 Appendix
7.1 Proof of Lemma 1
By contradiction, say only N0 < N o⁄ers are accepted. Without loss of generality let us as-
sume that N0 = 1 and that the o⁄er accepted is by ￿rm 1. If this is an equilibrium it means
that the lobbying expenditure is enough to compensate the government for the loss of welfare,
l1 = ￿￿[V (t1;0;:::;T) ￿ V (0;0;:::;T)] and that ￿1 (t1;0;:::;T) ￿ l1 ￿ ￿1 (0;0;:::;T). In order
to prove that ￿rm 2 will have an incentive to lobby for a tari⁄ t2 ￿ t1, it is su¢ cient to show
that ￿2 (t1;t1;:::;T) ￿ l2 ￿ ￿2 (t1;0;:::;T) with l2 = ￿￿[V (t1;t1;:::;T) ￿ V (t1;0;:::;T)]. We can
show that ￿2 (t1;t1;:::;T) ￿ ￿2 (t1;0;:::;T) + ￿[V (t1;t1;:::;T) ￿ V (t1;0;:::;T)] > ￿1 (t1;0;:::;T) ￿
￿1 (0;0;:::;T)+￿[V (t1;0;:::;T) ￿ V (0;0;:::;T)].24 The right-hand side of this inequality is positive
by assumption and this proves that ￿rm 2 will also have an incentive to lobby for the same tari⁄
t1. This contradicts the statement that having only one ￿rm￿ s o⁄er accepted is an equilibrium.
7.2 Equilibrium in the lobbying game
Section 3.4 claims that the symmetric game admits only equilibria where ￿rms either lobby together
or lobby alone, but do not do both. We here present a formal derivation and proposition.
In what follows we drop the subscript i when it does not lead to ambiguity and adopt the
notation ￿ (x) for pro￿ts and V (x) for indirect utility function when x is the symmetric tari⁄ on
all di⁄erentiated goods. From (9) and (11) ￿rm i problem at stage 1 can be re-written as:
max
L￿L￿i




where T￿i = T (L￿i) (13)
and f (T) =
￿
f1 (T) = ￿ (￿) + ￿
N [V (￿) ￿ V (T)] + ￿ [V (T) ￿ V (0)] + L￿i if T ￿ ￿
f2 (T) = ￿ (T) + ￿ [V (T) ￿ V (0)] + L￿i if T > ￿
If we use the speci￿c functional forms for ￿ (￿) and V (￿) then we can rewrite f (T) (omitting




























where K = ￿
￿




. One can easily check that f1 (￿) = f2 (￿) and that f2 (T) is
maximized at T =
￿￿￿
2+N￿. We indicate by T￿ the optimal choice of T by ￿rm i and from now on we
disregard the constant K since it does not a⁄ect the maximization problem. We can easily reject
that there is an equilibrium with T￿ > T, so we can focus on the region T￿i ￿ T ￿ T to ￿nd the
optimum.
Case 1 - If N￿ < ￿ then f1 (T) is increasing in T for T > 0. It is easy to verify that ￿ < T
and the solution to the maximization problem is T￿ = T. In equilibrium ￿rms only lobby together.
Figure A1 illustrates this case graphically.
Case 2 - If N￿ > ￿ then f1 (T) is decreasing in T for T > 0, as Figure A2 illustrates graphically.
24The algebraic expressions are cumbersome and not instructive, but available upon requests from the authors.
29Lemma 5 ￿ is decreasing in ￿.
Proof. The derivative of ￿ with respect to ￿ is negative.




= (￿ ￿ ￿) ￿ (2 + ￿)￿
= (￿ ￿ ￿)
￿
1 ￿
2 + ￿ ￿
p
￿ (2 + ￿)
2 + ￿ ￿
p
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and correspondingly b L such that



























N (N￿ ￿ ￿)(2 + ￿ ￿ N￿ + N2￿)
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Figure A3 shows how to determine ￿0 and ￿00 graphically.
Proposition 7 When N￿ > ￿, the solution T￿ of the maximization problem is:
1. If ￿ < ￿00 then T￿ = T
2. If ￿ ￿ ￿00 then: (a) T￿ = T￿i if T￿i ￿ b T (￿); (b) T￿ = T if T￿i > b T (￿):
Proof. From the de￿nition of f (T) it is straightforward to verify that we have a boundary solution




and T￿ = T otherwise.
In order to convey the intuition for this proposition we illustrate case 1 in Figure A4, case 2(a)
in Figure A5 and case 2(b) in Figure A6.
Proposition 8 When N￿ > ￿ the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of the lobbying game is:
1. If ￿ < ￿00 then ￿rms lobby together with T￿ = T
2. If ￿00 < ￿ ￿ ￿0 then there are multiple equilibria
30(a) Firms lobby alone with T￿ = 0 and t￿
i = ￿ (this equilibrium Pareto dominates the
following).





0;(1 ￿ (N ￿ 1)￿￿)L
￿





where ￿￿ = L￿b L
L and lobby alone if not.
3. If ￿ > ￿0 then ￿rms lobby alone with T￿ = 0 and t￿
i = ￿.
Proof.
1. This part follows directly from proposition 7
2. We have two cases:
(a) Choosing T￿ = 0 is a Nash equilibrium for all ￿rms. Consider the strategy of Li = 0 then
L￿i = 0. According to proposition 7 since b T (￿) ￿ 0 =) T￿ = 0 which con￿rms that




, so the payo⁄ would be higher
for all ￿rms if they could coordinate on this equilibrium (rather than the equilibrium
in point 2.b). Since the government is indi⁄erent in both cases this equilibrium Pareto
dominates the lobbying together equilibrium in point 2.b.
(b) If Li￿ s are in region A￿ then Li < L ￿ b L =) L￿i > b L =) T￿i > b T (￿) then according
to proposition 7 ￿rms choose T￿ = T and they lobby together. Also in this case ￿ < T
and they will not lobby alone in stage 2. If Li￿ s are not in region A￿, then there exists
and index i such that Li > L ￿ b L =) L￿i ￿ b L =) T￿i ￿ b T (￿), then according to
proposition 7 ￿rms choose T￿ = T￿i =) Ti = 0 =) Li = 0 which is a contradiction
with Li > L ￿ b L. Note that we need ￿ ￿ ￿0 because if ￿ > ￿0 then b T (￿) > T0 since
f1 is decreasing in ￿. Then b L > N￿1
N L =) ￿￿ < 1
N. This would imply that A￿ is an
empty set and this case is not of interest.
3. Since we restricted the choice of T￿ to 0 ￿ T￿ ￿ T, then 0 ￿ L￿ ￿ L. Suppose T￿ > 0 and
so L￿ > 0. Suppose ￿rm i is the one paying the largest share of L￿. Therefore Li ￿ L￿
N =)
L￿i ￿ N￿1
N L￿ ￿ N￿1
N L =) T￿i ￿ T0. Then, since ￿ > ￿0 and f1 is increasing in ￿, we get
T￿i ￿ b T (￿). So, according to proposition 7, T￿ = T￿i or L￿ = L￿i or Li = 0 which is in
contradiction with Li ￿ L￿
N . Therefore T￿ = 0 and L￿ = 0, which implies that all ￿rms lobby
alone.
7.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Although the formal proof of this corollary is a straightforward application of proposition 825,
we give here a heuristic proof. To shorten notation we employ the same abbreviations adopted
above for ￿ (x) and V (x): Part 1 of the corollary is straightforward. In order to understand the
25Since ￿ is a monotonicly decreasing function of ￿ and ￿
0 and ￿
00 are not functions of ￿ then one can state
proposition 8 in terms of ￿, ￿
0 and ￿
00.
31characterization of the equilibrium for ￿ > ￿
2 we need to consider pro￿table deviations by the
individual ￿rm as a function of the parameter of interest ￿.
For part 2, ￿rst we need to determine the lowest level of ￿ for which lobbying together is
sustainable. The easiest way of supporting joint lobbying is when ￿ = 1
2. Starting from joint
lobbying and equal share of lobbying expenditures we consider the possibility of ￿rm 1 deviating at
stage 1 and not paying 1
2L (foreseeing that both ￿rms will increase the level of individual lobbying
expenditures at stage 2). Denote the di⁄erence in payo⁄s between staying in the trade association
and deviating as D1 (￿):
















where T0 is the tari⁄ that the trade association can negotiate with L = 1
2 L. We can show that
D1 (￿) is increasing in ￿26, it is negative at ￿ = 0 and positive for ￿ ! 1 hence it crosses the
horizontal axis only once, thus determining the location of ￿0. For ￿ ￿ ￿0 staying in the trade
association with ￿ = 1
2 is an equilibrium, while for ￿ < ￿0 the only equilibrium is to lobby alone.
Second, we need to determine the highest level of ￿ for which lobbying alone is sustainable.
That is we start from individual lobbying and consider a deviation in which ￿rm 1 unilaterally
contributes the entire lobbying expenditure of the trade association L (foreseeing that this will
eliminate individual lobbying in the second stage). Denote the bene￿t from such deviation as
D2 (￿):
D2 (￿) = ￿￿1 (￿) ￿
1
2













We can show that D2 (￿) is increasing in ￿, it is negative at ￿ = 0 and positive for ￿ ! 1 hence
it crosses the horizontal axis only once, thus determining the location of ￿00. For ￿ > ￿00 lobbying
alone is never an equilibrium.
For part 3, we calculate ￿ (￿) as the maximum share of L paid by ￿rm 1 that makes joint
lobbying feasible. That is we ￿nd ￿ that makes ￿rm 1 indi⁄erent between paying its share of L and










V (￿) ￿ V
￿
T0￿￿
where T0 is the tari⁄ that the trade association can negotiate with L = (1 ￿ ￿) L. Once an
expression for ￿ (￿) is found, it is easy to show that it is increasing in ￿.27 Because of symmetry one
can reproduce the argument for the maximum share of L by ￿rm 2, 1￿￿, that makes joint lobbying
feasible and show that this increasing in ￿. This is equivalent to having a decreasing function ￿(￿).
7.4 Full characterization of the e⁄ect of concentration
For the next proposition it is convenient to de￿ne the following variable r =
￿






full characterization of the e⁄ect of concentration is given by:
Proposition 9 The equilibrium mode of lobbying depends on N according to the following pattern:
26This simply requires taking the derivative of D1 (￿) with respect to ￿ which involves long and not instructive
expressions. Calculations are available from the authors upon request.
27The expression for ￿ (￿) and its derivative are long and not instructive, but available upon request from the
authors.
321. If ￿ > ￿ and
(a) r < 1 then ￿rms only lobby alone for all N
(b) 1 < r < 2 then ￿rms lobby alone for 1 < N < e N2 and there are multiple equilibria for
N > e N2
(c) r > 2 then ￿rms lobby alone for 1 < N < e N1, there are multiple equilibria for e N1 <
N < e N2 and ￿rms lobby together for N > e N2
2. If ￿
N < ￿ < ￿ and
(a) r < 1 then ￿rms lobby together for ￿
￿ < N < e N1, there are multiple equilibria for
e N1 < N < e N2 and ￿rms lobby alone for N > e N2
(b) 1 < r < 2 then:
i. ￿rms lobby together for ￿
￿ < N < e N1 and there are multiple equilibria for N > e N1
ii. or ￿rms lobby together for ￿
￿ < N < e N1, there are multiple equilibria for e N1 <
N < e N2
2, ￿rms lobby alone for e N2
2 < N < e N2
1 and there are multiple equilibria for
N > e N2
1
(c) r > 2 then:
i. Firms only lobby together for all N
ii. or ￿rms lobby together for ￿
￿ < N < e N1
2, there are multiple equilibria for e N1
2 < N <
e N1
1 and ￿rms lobby together for N > e N1
1
iii. or ￿rms lobby together for ￿
￿ < N < e N1
2, there are multiple equilibria for e N1
2 <
N < e N2
2, ￿rms lobby alone for e N2
2 < N < e N2
1, there are multiple equilibria for
e N2
1 < N < e N1
1, ￿rms lobby together for N > e N1
1
3. If ￿ < ￿
N then ￿rms lobby together for all N
Proof. Conceptually this proposition is a reformulation of proposition 8 in terms of the number of
￿rms. The equilibrium mode of lobbying therefore depends on the relationship between ￿, ￿0 and
￿00. It is easy to verify that ￿(N), ￿0 (N) and ￿00 (N) are all decreasing functions of N. They








￿00 ! 2, so asymptotically, ￿rms lobby together for r < 1, lobby
alone for r > 2 and we have multiple equilibria for 1 < r < 2. For low values of N, depending on
parameters, ￿(N) can start from below ￿0 (N) and ￿00 (N), from between them or above them, so
as N increase we observe di⁄erent equilibrium modes of lobbying. We provide here a sketch of the
proof.28 We start by de￿ning some variables: y (N) = 2+￿
2+N￿, R = ￿ 2+￿
￿￿￿, R0 = ￿0 2+￿
U , R00 = ￿00 2+￿
U ,
R = T 2+￿
U , u = 2 + ￿, v = 2 + ￿, y￿ = v
u.
1. To prove point 1.a consider that for 0 < r < 1 it is always the case that R00 ￿ R0 < R. This
implies that we only have lobbying alone. To prove point 1.b and 1.c we are going to state
without proof that when r > 1 the two curves R and R0 intersect at a unique ~ y2, such that
R(y) < R0 (y) for 0 < y < ~ y2 and R(y) > R0 (y) for ~ y2 < y < y￿. Furthermore, when r > 2
the two curves R and R
00
intersect at a unique ~ y1, such that R(y) < R
00
(y) for 0 < y < ~ y1
28Complete details are available from the authors upon request.
33and R(y) > R00 (y) for ~ y1 < y < y￿. Finally, if 1 < r < 2 then R(y) > R00 (y) for all y. It is
possible to verify that ~ y1 < ~ y2. To summarize:
If 1 < r < 2
R00(y) < R(y) < R0(y) for 0 < y < ~ y2 Multiple equilibria
R00(y) < R0(y) < R(y) for ~ y2 < y < y￿ Alone
If 2 < r
R(y) < R00(y) < R0(y) for 0 < y < ~ y1 Together
R00(y) < R(y) < R0(y) for ~ y1 < y < ~ y2 Multiple equilibria
R00(y) < R0(y) < R(y) for ~ y2 < y < y￿ Alone
which is equivalent to points 1.b and 1.c stated in terms of y.
2. To prove point 2 it is possible to show that for 0 < r < 1 there is a unique ~ y2 such that
R0 (y) < R(y) for y < ~ y2 and R0 (y) > R(y) for y > ~ y2. It is also possible to show that for
r > 1 either R0 (y) > R(y) for 0 < y < 1 or there are two roots ~ y2
1 and ~ y2
2 such that:
R(y) < R0 (y) for 0 < y < ~ y2
1
R(y) > R0 (y) for ~ y2
1 < y < ~ y2
2
R(y) < R0 (y) for ~ y2
2 < y < 1
Furthermore, it is possible to show that for 0 < r < 2 there is a unique ~ y1 such that
R(y) > R00 (y) for y < ~ y1 and R(y) < R00 (y) for y > ~ y1. For r > 2:
If y￿ > 4
3 R(y) < R00 (y) for 0 < y ￿ 1
If y￿ < 4
3
8
> > > <



























R(y) < R00 (y)
R00 (y) < R(y)
R(y) < R00 (y)
for 0 < y ￿ ~ y1
1
for ~ y1
1 < y ￿ ~ y1
2
for ~ y1
2 < y ￿ 1
34To summarize:
If 0 < r < 1
R00(y) < R0(y) < R(y) for 0 < y < ~ y2 Alone
R00(y) < R(y) < R0(y) for ~ y2 < y < ~ y1 Multiple equilibria
R(y) < R00(y) < R0(y) for ~ y1 < y < 1 Together
If 1 < r < 2
R00(y) < R(y) < R0(y) for 0 < y < ~ y1 Multiple equilibria
R(y) < R00(y) < R0(y) for ~ y1 < y < 1 Together
or
R00(y) < R(y) < R0(y) for 0 < y < ~ y2
1 Multiple equilibria
R00(y) < R0(y) < R(y) for ~ y2
1 < y < ~ y2
2 Alone
R00(y) < R(y) < R0(y) for ~ y2
2 < y < ~ y1 Multiple equilibria
R(y) < R00(y) < R0(y) for ~ y1 < y < 1 Together
If 2 < r
R(y) < R00(y) < R0(y) for ~ y1 < y < 1 Together
or
R(y) < R00(y) < R0(y) for 0 < y < ~ y1
1 Together
R00(y) < R(y) < R0(y) for ~ y1
1 < y < ~ y1
2 Multiple equilibria
R(y) < R00(y) < R0(y) for ~ y1
2 < y < 1 Together
or
R(y) < R00(y) < R0(y) for 0 < y < ~ y1
1 Together
R00(y) < R(y) < R0(y) for ~ y1
1 < y < ~ y2
1 Multiple equilibria
R00(y) < R0(y) < R(y) for ~ y2
1 < y < ~ y2
2 Alone
R00(y) < R(y) < R0(y) for ~ y2
2 < y < ~ y1
2 Multiple equilibria
R(y) < R00(y) < R0(y) for ~ y1
2 < y < 1 Together
3. To prove point 3 consider that if ￿ < ￿









































Table 1: Summary Statistics
) g) () () ()
(IndFrac) 4
Obs. 286 286 286 286 286 286 286 286 286 286 286
Mean 0.03 0.23 0.31 0.62 0.42 0.19 0.67 4.88 91.83 40.45 0.05
Median 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.26 0.15 0.02 0.96 3.41 59.12 37.72 0.02
St. Dev 0.04 0.31 0.41 0.92 0.65 0.65 0.40 5.45 98.19 18.79 0.21
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.20 6.48 0.00 0.00
Max 0.19 1.00 1.00 6.53 3.63 4.66 1.00 63.70 783.26 100.00 3.25
Notes to Table 1: Tariff data are from Feenstra, Romalis, and Schott (2002). Non-tariff mesures (weighted and unweighted) are constructed from TRAINS-WITS, 
see text for details. Lobbying Amounts and Firm Size are in US$ Millions from the Senate Office of Public Records, see text for data construction. Elasticity of 
Substitution data are from Broda and Weinstein (2006). All economic SIC 4 level Controls in this table are from BEA and US Census Bureau with the exception of 




































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
MEDIUM SIGMA -0.275 -0.343 1.15
[0.098]*** [0.098]*** [0.968]
HIGH SIGMA -0.182 -0.245 3.543
[0.093]* [0.099]** [0.938]***
Sigma -0.006 -0.01 -0.021
[0.002]*** [0.005]** [0.006]***
Fraction of value  0.007 0.003 0.004 0.008 0.012
of shipmts. by top 4 [0.002]*** [0.002] [0.002]* [0.022] [0.022]
K/L 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.005 0.007
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.005] [0.006]
Average Firm Size 0.522 0.231 0.204 -0.144 0.468
[0.465] [0.229] [0.197] [1.138] [1.205]
Marginal Effect
MEDIUM SIGMA -0.0571 -0.0745 0.00196
[0.0207]*** [0.0237]*** [0.00167]
HIGH SIGMA -0.0359 -0.0530 0.00605
[0.0186]* [0.0217]** [0.00165]***
Sigma -0.00118 -0.0022 -0.00004
[0.00039]*** [0.0011]** [0.00001]***
Fraction of value  0.0014 0.0007 0.0008 0.00001 0.00002
of shipmts. by top 4 [0.0004]*** [0.0005] [0.0005]* [0.00004] [0.00004]
K/L 0.00030 0.0003 0.0003 0.00001 0.00001
[0.00008]*** [0.0001]***[0.0001]***[0.00001] [0.00001]
Average Firm Size 0.1006 0.0496 0.0423 -0.00025 -0.00077
[0.0905] [0.0492] [0.0407] [0.00194] [0.00198]
Left-censored 11122119 6 9 6
Right-censored 131 131 142 144 142 123 123 . .
Observations 324 324 346 339 346 286 286 382 382
Notes to Table 2: Tobit estimator with robust standard errors in brackets. Marginal effects on the latent variable reported in the 
upper panel. Marginal effects on the realized dependent variable in the lower panel. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; 
*** significant at 1%. The omitted group for the elasticity of substitution dummies (SIGMA) is the low percentile (<33%) 
dummy. All economic SIC 4 level Controls are from BEA and US Census Bureau with the exception of capital-labor ratio from 
the NBER Manufacturing Industry Productivity Database.


































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
MEDIUM SIGMA -0.409 -0.413 0.318
[0.102]*** [0.101]*** [1.044]
HIGH SIGMA -0.303 -0.328 2.653
[0.103]*** [0.102]*** [0.985]***
Sigma -0.01 -0.01 -0.022
[0.005]** [0.005]** [0.007]***
Fraction of value  0.006 0.005 0.005 0.037 0.04
of shipmts. by top 4 [0.003]** [0.003]* [0.003]** [0.023] [0.023]*
K/L 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.008 0.009
[0.001]** [0.001] [0.001] [0.008] [0.008]
Average Firm Size 0.046 0.423 0.194 -2.585 -1.451
[0.453] [0.694] [0.529] [4.897] [5.304]
Geo Concentration -0.212 -0.275 0.038 -0.092 -0.117 -0.073 -0.119 2.347 0.129
[0.361] [0.367] [0.372] [0.373] [0.372] [0.361] [0.367] [3.761] [3.898]
Pol Conc Herf -0.475 -0.433 -1.866 -1.257 -0.612 -2.192 -2.12 -15.273 -14.053
[0.994] [1.022] [1.146] [1.077] [1.101] [0.987]** [1.099]* [11.205] [11.250]
log Tot. Sales 0.057 0.059 0.036 0.032 0.049 0.023 0.029 0.804 0.858
[0.034]* [0.035]* [0.036] [0.036] [0.039] [0.036] [0.037] [0.394]** [0.392]**
No. HS8 Tariff Lines 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.009 0.011
[0.000] [0.000]* [0.000]** [0.000]*** [0.000]* [0.000]* [0.000]** [0.006] [0.007]
SIC 1 Dummy (2000) 0.499 0.447 0.466 0.406 0.455 0.47 0.421 1.211 1.367
[0.083]*** [0.083]*** [0.081]*** [0.086]*** [0.083]*** [0.084]*** [0.084]*** [0.913] [0.933]
Observations 246 246 249 249 249 246 246 334 334
Table 3:  Differentiation, Competition and Political Organization. Robustness.
Notes to Table 3: Tobit estimator with robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
The omitted group for the elasticity of substitution dummies (SIGMA) is the middle percentile (33%) dummy.  Political and Geographic 
Concentration measures are from Busch and Reinhardt (1999). All economic SIC 4 level Controls are from BEA and US Census Bureau. 

































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Fract. of Individual  -0.115 -0.114 -0.010 -0.943 -0.781 -0.137 -1.245 -1.176 -0.078
Lobbying [0.069]* [0.054]** [0.006]* [0.270]*** [0.203]*** [0.034]*** [0.573]** [0.469]** [0.042]*
Import Penetration 0.044 0.064 0.033 -0.471 -0.311 -0.093 -0.282 -0.455 -0.099
[0.106] [0.079] [0.011]*** [0.563] [0.437] [0.063] [0.589] [0.499] [0.048]**
MEDIUM SIGMA 0.104 0.061 0.010 -0.036 -0.052 -0.011 -0.285 -0.273 -0.016
[0.059]* [0.047] [0.005]** [0.080] [0.063] [0.011] [0.146]* [0.120]** [0.011]
HIGH SIGMA 0.146 0.089 0.002 0.112 0.062 -0.004 -0.074 -0.085 -0.012
[0.057]** [0.044]** [0.004] [0.071] [0.055] [0.010] [0.107] [0.096] [0.009]
Fraction of value  0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.003 0.001 0.000 0.006 0.004 0.000
of shipmts. by top 4 [0.001] [0.001] [0.000]*** [0.002] [0.001] [0.000] [0.002]*** [0.002]** [0.000]
Import Elasticity -0.004 -0.003 0.000 -0.005 -0.004 0.000 -0.003 -0.002 0.000
[0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.000] [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.000] [0.002] [0.002] [0.000]
log Tot. Employment 0.103 0.064 0.003
[0.060]* [0.049] [0.005]
log Tot. Sales 0.022 0.011 -0.012
[0.055] [0.046] [0.005]**
No. HS8 Tariff Lines 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.001] [0.001] [0.000]*
SIC 1 Dummy (2000) 0.502 0.391 0.009
[0.189]*** [0.163]** [0.015]
Observations 267 267 267 267 267 267 233 233 233
Hansen J-Stat. p-value  0.35 0.15 0.04 0.75 0.97 0.36
Table 4: Trade Policy and Political Organization. OLS and Instrumental Variable Regressions.
Notes to Table 4: Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  Excluded instrument set 
for 2SLS estimates includes: Geographic  Concentration; Political Concentration Herf. index; Materials (including Electricity & 
Fuels)/Production Workers; Tot. real capital stock/Prod. Workers; Non Prod. Workers/Prod. Workers. Total sales, Real capital stock, 
Materials, Structures and Equipment are in logs of $ millions. Total employment and production workers are in logs of 1000s.  Materials 
(including Electricity & Fuels), Production Workers, Tot. real capital stock are from the NBER Manufacturing Industry Productivity Database. 
The omitted group for the elasticity of substitution dummies (SIGMA) is the low percentile (<33%) dummy.  Political and Geographic 
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Figure A6 